Appeal to INTOSAI
1. Around the end of September 2022, our Service received a complaint that the offspring of state officials and other politically influential persons or prominent families are serving during their service in the National Guard under favourable and privileged conditions in the administration of the Ministry of Defence and the GEF, and even in positions that may not be required but have been created for that purpose, which would mean a waste of public resources, since the transfer of these soldiers from National Guard units leads to the creation of needs that are covered at public expense by Contracted Soldiers (CGS). For example, a number of privates appear to be performing duties in ancillary services in the Minister's office and more generally on the floor where the leadership of the Ministry and the GSF is housed, such as providing coffee and other beverages, etc, at a time when there is a branch of the Officers' Club on the ground floor of the building, where some of these officers are also stationed. After the investigation of the case was opened, we received information from another source that was now specific and related to the sons of current and former state officials and other politically influential persons, as well as other named persons, even if they cannot be considered to be in a position of influence. It is noteworthy that, based on our information, a son of a State Official completed his term of office in September 2022 and was immediately succeeded in the Ministry of Defence in such a privileged position by his first cousin
2. Considering that the audit could easily be done with the help of the Ministry of Defence's own administration and the GDF, we informed them first verbally and then on 5.10.2022, by email and requested a list of the enlisted soldiers/officers serving in the offices of the Ministry of Defence and the GDF, with an indication for each one if, to the best of their knowledge, they have any form of kinship or peculiar relationship with current or former government officials or senior officers of the National Guard.
Despite initial verbal assurances that the information would be provided, on 9.1.2023 we were informed by the Ministry of Defence that in the end the information would not be provided and that they would have the discretion to choose the soldiers who would accompany them.
3. On 13.1.2023, due to the above refusal to provide the requested data, which under the relevant legislation on filing data with the Auditor General constitutes a criminal offence, we reported the case to the Attorney General. On the same day, we forwarded a complaint to the Independent Authority against Corruption so that, in the exercise of its statutory powers, it could decide whether there are grounds to investigate the possible commission of the criminal offences provided for in Articles 105 ("Abuse of authority") and 105A ("Interference with a competent authority") of Part III of the Penal Code ("Offences against the exercise of legal authority").
4. On 13.2.2023, the Attorney General informed us by letter that he did not find sufficient grounds for our request for access to the requested information. In particular, while the Attorney General acknowledged that the examination of a matter leading to a waste of public funds falls within the scope of our duties, he nevertheless decided to act as an audit authority and, in this context, requested and received information and data from the Ministry of Defence. On the basis of that information, he did not himself ascertain an increase in the needs of the National Guard in SYOP. In fact, instead of his assessment of whether there was an increase in the need for SYOP, which would constitute waste and/or lead to increased expenditure, being carried out by the competent department of our State, which is the Audit Service, the Legal Service carried it out, substituting its own judgment for ours, which we consider unacceptable.
The above decision of the Attorney General was made in his capacity as Public Prosecutor and his authority in this matter is unreviewable under the Constitution.
We note in this regard that when in a similar manner in 2009 the Department of Merchant Shipping had refused to provide evidence to the then Auditor General, Attorney General Petros Clerides had made it clear that when the Auditor General judges that he needs evidence in the context of his audit "this judgment of the Auditor General is outside the control of the Legal Service".
5. Notwithstanding the above concerning undermining the independence of our Office by the unauditable powers granted by the Constitution to the Attorney General, we considered that since there has been a change in the governance of the country, we could, in any event, conduct the audit upon the assumption of power by the new Government. Our hope that the matter would be dealt with differently was based on the President's election pledges. Specifically, in the Pillar "State" - "Reconstruction of the State", the following is recorded, among other things. There is no doubt that corruption, as a complex phenomenon, is in a two-way relationship of mutual feedback with clientelism. At the same time, corruption is also intertwined with a lack of accountability and transparency, the undermining of institutions and the erosion of traditional social values."[/I]
In this particular case, the relevant legislation is clear. According to Article 66 of the National Guard Law (Law 19(I)/2011), each placement, transfer and secondment of a soldier or conscript, as the case may be, to a unit or service of the Force is carried out on the basis of service and operational needs and in accordance with a merit system. Every fellow citizen can understand that the matter touches on basic principles of equality and equity and general principles of good administration
6. Unfortunately, the new Minister of Defence, after consultation with the President of the Republic, has decided to deny us access[/B] to the relevant data. The matter is extremely serious since, based on the evidence in the complaint, a state official and a sitting minister is affected by the audit[/B]. It is also significant that, since our intention was to extend the audit to 2020, the audit would also cover the period when the current Assistant Attorney General was Minister of Defence
7. Since the salaries of National Guard soldiers (conscripts and contractors) are covered by public funds, through the State Budget, then undoubtedly the use of these funds in the most economical, efficient and effective way, in order to avoid waste, is subject to the control of the Auditor General. This is also required by Article 7 of Law No. 113(I)/2002, entitled "Removal of doubts about the authority of the Auditor General" and states that:
"For the avoidance of any doubt, it is hereby declared that the Auditor General shall have the power and may conduct a management audit of a Ministry, or any department or agency thereof, any legal person governed by public law, municipality, community council or other fund or organization controlled by him, to ascertain whether the above are operating and using their available resources in a financial, efficient and effective manner." (emphasis ours).
We also emphasize once again that the Standards of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), which, among other things, define in detail the concept of public audit, explicitly state that management audit, as performed by Supreme Audit Institutions, is the independent, objective and reliable examination of whether government enterprises, systems, functions, operations, programmes, activities or organisations are operating in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and whether there is room for improvement (ISSAI 300, para. 9). In explaining the three basic principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, it states that the principle of effectiveness means making the best use of available resources, i.e. it deals with the relationship between the resources used and the results delivered in terms of quantity, quality and timing (ISSAI 300, para. 9). 11).
Based on the above, it is clear that the Auditor General is responsible for examining the use of public resources in the most effective, efficient and economical manner. It is also undisputed that expenditure on personnel in general, but also expenditure relating to National Guard soldiers in particular, which is covered by public funds, falls within this framework. Moreover, in a large number of our Reports, over the years, we have referred to human resources utilisation issues. In particular, in fact, for the Ministry of Defence, we have repeatedly referred to issues of utilisation of Cyprus Army officers in clerical duties in the administration of the Ministry, and the Ministry itself not only did not question our competence in this regard, but provided us with all the relevant information we deemed necessary to request.
Notwithstanding the above, the Government considers the Auditor General to be incompetent to deal with the matter, particularly with regard to the employment of soldiers on non-operational duties, but on drink-making or clerical duties.
8. The principles of independence of SAIs are contained in the Mexico Declaration ("The Mexico Declaration") adopted, together with the Lima Declaration ("The Lima Declaration"), by UN General Assembly Resolutions 66/209 and Doc. 22.12.2011 and No. 69/228 and dated 22.12.2011. The eight pillars of the independence principles are as follows. The existence of an appropriate and effective constitutional/legal framework and the practical application of its provisions.
ii. The independence of HEI heads, including employment security and legal immunity in the normal exercise of their functions.
iii. A sufficiently wide range of terms of reference and discretionary powers in the discharge of HEI responsibilities.
iv. Unrestricted access to information.
v. The right and obligation to prepare reports on findings.
vi. The freedom for the HEI itself to decide the content and timing of the preparation, issuance and publication of audit reports.
vii. The existence of a satisfactory mechanism to comply with the HEI's recommendations.
viii. Financial and administrative autonomy and the availability of adequate human and financial resources.
In the present case, the Government is in flagrant violation of pillar (iv) concerning access to information.
9. We have repeatedly explained the importance of upholding independence principles as an indispensable prerequisite for sound financial management and combating rampant corruption.
The issue of independence is so important that INTOSAI has established the SIRAM (SAI Independence Rapid Advocacy Mechanism) for rapid intervention in countries where audit independence is threatened. This mechanism had also been used by our Service in 2020 and through this mechanism INTOSAI had issued on 24.2.2021 its well-known communication, which fully vindicated our Service.
We intend to activate the same mechanism immediately with an update to be forwarded. Importantly, in order to further strengthen this mechanism, INTOSAI has scheduled a meeting of its technocrats for 24-28 April 2023 with the Auditors General of a number of countries that were deemed to be able to contribute to the strengthening of the institution, including the Auditor General of the Republic of Cyprus.
10. At the same time, and given that the full implementation of INTOSAI standards is part of the acquis communautaire, on this issue our Office will inform both the European Commission, which will hold meetings in Cyprus on the rule of law issue in the coming days, as well as the European Union Contact Committee which is the autonomous, independent and non-political assembly of the heads of the European Court of Auditors and the Supreme Audit Institutions of the 27 Member States of the European Union, which Cyprus will chair in 2024.
11. Unfortunately, the previous government temporarily prevented us (for about a year) from auditing the Cyprus Investment Programme files, and the present government, even worse, permanently denies us the control of the management of human resources (which as an object of control falls within the hard and indisputable core of our activities), in a matter that points to phenomena of corruption and bribery.Contents of this article including associated images are owned by PIO
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or PIO
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Contents of this article including associated images are owned by PIO
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or PIO
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