Almost half a century later, what does history teach us about the 1974 disaster?
The coup of 15 July and the Turkish invasion of 1974 constitute a national catastrophe with tragic consequences for Cyprus and incalculable repercussions on wider Greek-Turkish relations. Equally tragic is the fact that the coup d'état of the Junta of Demetrios Ioannidis gave the excuse and justification for the Turkish invasion, under the tolerance or indifference of the Great Powers (mainly the United States and the "guarantor" of the Republic of Cyprus, Britain). Essentially, Cyprus paid with heavy costs and suffering, on the one hand, the seven-year dictatorship in Greece and especially its most extreme form, the Ioannidis regime and, on the other hand, the Turkish expansionism that realized a long-term goal, the conquest of Cyprus. The catastrophe of 1974 is seen in its true enormity if it is placed in the broader history of the Cyprus problem and we consider how its post-war claim began in the 1950s, as a demand for self-determination and union of Cyprus with Greece, and how it ended within 25 years.
According to many, the coup and the Turkish invasion were so predictable that only the naive could not see the aftermath. What do the documents of the time reveal?
They are two different chapters. As for the coup, there is testimony, which has increased in recent years, in memoirs and interviews, where associates of Archbishop Makarios claim to have warned him or had intense fears of the impending coup. Having read unpublished transcripts of President Makarios' conversations with the dictator Georgios Papadopoulos and his published speeches or interviews, I believe it was impossible for him to believe that Greek officers would proceed to carry out a coup against him. Moreover, he maintained a similar certainty that Turkey would not go ahead with its threats to invade an independent state such as the Republic of Cyprus or ultimately be obstructed, as it was in 1964 or 1967. As for the Turkish invasion, there are dozens of documents that the Pentagon and the Greek government of the Junta's puppets in Athens had been informed by different and reliable Greek sources, from Cyprus, Turkey and Britain, apart from what was reported by foreign news agencies, at least from Friday 19 July 1974 about the preparations and the imminent Turkish military operation "Attila". This is not naivety, but criminal omissions or deliberate indifference amounting to high treason.
The Cyprus File consists of the findings of the Special Committees of the Greek and Cypriot Parliaments, the testimonies taken from the respective parliamentary committees and the additional archival material gathered. Eight volumes have been published, some 20 volumes remain to be published. From 2019 onwards, things have been somewhat muddled. Recently the President of the Parliament, Ms Demetriou, said that the ninth volume will be published in the autumn. Do you know anything?
No, I don't know anything more. I hope that publication will continue, either print or digital, as the three-year delay is too long and incomprehensible. I know that on the part of the House of Representatives, since 2019, both Mr. Dimitris Syllouris and Mr. Adamos Adamou and Ms. Anita Demetriou have made several interventions and efforts to continue the publication, as provided for in the relevant protocols of cooperation signed between the Speakers of the two Parliaments since the time of Messrs. Nikos Voutsis and Giannakis Omirou (January 2016).
In your opinion, what is the most important finding from the documents you have gone through from the Cyprus File archive?
The documents, mainly the "testimonial material", collected by the various departments and ministries in Athens contain thousands of small details that shock the researcher and compose the picture of the national catastrophe in dimensions wider than those we know or have experienced. It documents the incompetence and ineptitude of the military leadership which, precisely because it came from a hierarchy imposed and eroded by the seven-year dictatorship, was incapable of dealing with the Turkish invasion. A military leadership that was highly capable of organising coups and overthrowing democratic governments but proved totally incapable of defending the national integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. And its members, during the Turkish invasion, either acted as a fifth column, avoiding to implement the "Defence Plans" and protect Cyprus, as they should, or were only interested in their personal survival in view of the looming restoration of democracy in Greece. I could list dozens of "important findings" about the attitude of the Armed Forces command in Athens or the General Staff in Nicosia, about the history of the military units of the National Guard, about the heroism or faint-heartedness of individual officers. What prevails, day after day since 20 July 1974, is a picture of disintegration, chaos and confusion, while if the basic observance of the defence plans for dealing with an enemy invasion had been demonstrated, it is highly doubtful that the Turkish invasion would have succeeded. Even with the mediation of the coup d'état of 15 July, which had grave consequences for the mental unity of Cypriot Hellenism.
Did we learn something we didn't know, through the Cyprus File?
As for the eight volumes published to date (2018-2019) by the Hellenic Parliament and the House of Representatives, they contain the final forms of the depositions to the Greek Parliament during 1986-1988 of officers who played an important role in the Cyprus problem or held high or key positions during the period 1967-1974 (M. Georgitsis, K. Kobokis, G. Denisis, Ath. Simeoforides, Ath. Slavenitis, etc.). They are the original testimonies given to a parliamentary committee that met behind closed doors and are finally available to researchers and every citizen, since until now they were classified, regardless of whether part of them had been leaked from time to time. They shed light on several aspects of the events of 1974 and the period that preceded it, while they reveal the way in which the Greek parliamentary parties dealt with the 'Cyprus file' during 1986-1988. The publication of all the testimonies is an important first step in the study of many aspects of the history of Cyprus and Greece in the period in question, which until now has been impossible to do systematically and using reliable sources.
Apart from its moral value and national importance, the delivery of the material of the Greek Parliament to Cyprus has political and military lessons. The magnitude of the betrayal was effectively revealed. But obviously there is material that will never be found, isn't there?
It is obvious that some of the Greek archival material (in Greece and Cyprus) on the Cyprus problem has been destroyed or will probably never see the light of day. And this is true (for military, political and diplomatic documents) also for the period before 1967, since in Greece even documents from the 1950s on the Cyprus problem, in the large public archives, are not accessible to researchers, for inexplicable reasons. The above silences have led to an unacceptably long and morbid state of fear of those responsible in giving to research valuable archival units on the history of Cyprus. On the other hand, some of this material has found its way into the hands of various unauthorised persons or artisans, who dispose of selected extracts or parts of it as they see fit. For example, from Alexis Papachelas' recent book "A Dark Room" we have learned that some people are in possession of audio transcripts of what was discussed at the crucial "War Council" that met belatedly in Athens on the morning of 20 July 1974. It is a historical audio document which, as far as I know, has not survived in a public Greek archive. I can understand how it fell into "alien hands", but it is totally unacceptable that the situation of indifference and "closed archives" continues 48 years after the summer of 1974. There are still among us protagonists of events, even of darker aspects.
Historical research on issues that remain unresolved, either as issues that generate political controversy or as collective and individual traumas and open wounds, is bound to face difficulties and obstacles, especially if one takes into account what was mentioned above about the lack of archival availability. There are strongly held views in parts or all of Cypriot society that are a product of personal experiences of the catastrophe that struck the country in 1974. As Seferis has already said, about a similar traumatic period in Greek history, 'the thought of the refugee, the thought of the prisoner, the thought of man as if he too had become a commodity, try to change it, you cannot'. Indeed, there are people "next door" who were protagonists in the events, families who mourn victims during the period of EOKAB's action or the coup or the Turkish invasion, perhaps even people who are probably guilty of war crimes or others, men and women, who were victims of war crimes and militaristic barbarism. And in addition, tens of thousands of refugees who have been deprived of their ancestral land and property since 1974. At the same time, various fanatics continue to preach their obsession with their own unique 'truth' and hatred of the inner 'other' while, at the same time, our times and the internet lend themselves to the reproduction of every unlikely conspiracy theory. In this landscape, it is obviously not an easy job for the 1974 historian since, in addition, for every line he writes, he has to conjure up his own traumatic experiences and memories. And of course, the historian does not work in the absence of society and its dominant views, but he must ask questions and seek answers and present the scientific product of his research with the utmost composure and sobriety and not with cries and anathemas. And fortunately, the modern history of Cyprus remains a period that attracts either older historians or younger colleagues, who also have the advantage of being "risk-averse". Indeed, representatives of the younger generation of historians have already produced important books on individual aspects, especially of military history. In the coming years, the scholarly debate on the history of 1974 is likely to gain more ground and a larger audience. May this lawful development go hand in hand with better days for our semi-occupied country.
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