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[Cyprus Times] What Tayyip Erdogan gained and lost in the meeting with Putin and Raisi

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The summit meeting between Putin, Erdogan and Raisi marked an upgrading of cooperation, but no "green light" for new Turkish intervention in Syria

The photo showing Ibrahim Raisi raising the hands of Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to underline that the "Astana process" reflects a more comprehensive and closer cooperation between three countries, one of which is a NATO member, the other is currently officially NATO's enemy and the third remains a threatening force for the US.

Of course, a closer reading of the history of this cooperation shows how developments in Syria over the past ten years have played a catalytic role. This is because the civil war for Syria has meant significant risks for all three countries, albeit from different starting points.

For Russia, the possibility of the fall of the Assad government meant the risk of losing a valuable ally in the region that, among other things, secured Russian bases in the Mediterranean.

For Iran, the possibility of Sunni fundamentalist movements such as the Islamic State taking power in Syria threatened both the Shiite populations, especially in neighbouring Iraq, and the overall balance of power in the region.

And for Turkey, which initially saw this as an opportunity for "regime change" in Syria, the great danger was that within this de-structuring treaty the possibility of a quasi-Kurdish state entity forming on Syrian soil, and even under the leadership of the PKK, was advancing.

The Russian and Iranian stance



Russia and Iran had a clear position from the outset: to support the Damascus government against the armed Islamist organisations and on this basis to strengthen a political process that would ensure that Syria remained a single sovereign state entity.

The latter meant that both Russia and Iran did not want there to be a Kurdish state entity within Syrian territory. Russia so as not to weaken Damascus' position and Iran, which has a Kurdish minority, so as not to open a cycle of border changes around the Kurdish one. Also, neither country takes kindly to the fact that the Kurdish YPG militias are the main US ally inside Syria.

It is this element that attracted Ankara. Turkey officially still takes a position in favour of overthrowing the Assad government and supports the armed Islamists of the "Syrian National Army". However, it knows that without the cooperation of Russia and Iran it would not be able to deal with the Kurdish problem. Especially since the US insists on cooperating with them and sees them as the way to maintain a presence and, more importantly, a right to have an indirect say in post-war developments in Syria. After all, to a large extent the Turkish presence inside Syria is based on how the Russian forces in particular enable it. Moreover, the way Russia is managing the situation in the Idlib enclave with the Syrian government forces is also important for Turkey, as it means that there is a balance with other Islamist organisations in the region.

What all three countries have in common on Syria is precisely the insistence on a unified and sovereign Syria, that is, a Syria in which there is no attempt at autonomy or self-determination of any region.

Of course, managing this balance is not always easy. Russia and Iran are pushing for an acceleration of the path towards a political solution, through the dialogue that has already begun, which on its horizon would raise an issue for the armed organizations still operating, including those supported by Turkey, and would certainly mean that there is a single sovereignty over the entire territory of Syria.

However, Turkey seems to be claiming to maintain and upgrade its presence on Syrian territory, seeking not only to strike at the Kurds but also to modify the population composition in those areas. This puts it at odds with both Russia and Iran.

"No" to a new Turkish operation in Syria

This may also explain why both the Iranian leadership, through the mouth of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei himself, and Russia have made it clear to Turkey that they cannot approve another operation, especially one in which the Kurds would be cleared from Tal Rifaat and Manbij. This is because Turkey means for Turkish forces to go there together with the armed opposition organisations that Turkey supports. This is in direct conflict with the objective of both the government forces and Russia and Iran to expand rather than shrink the area where the Damascus government exercises power. Russia's commitment in 2019 to phase out Kurdish armed militias from the region was precisely about government control of these areas, not Turkish control. This was the second denial received by Turkey, the first being apparently from the US, which would not want its key allies to be hurt. And this means that it is very difficult for Turkey to go ahead with another major operation without coming into direct confrontation with both the US and Russia and Iran.

The joint communiqué

The joint communiqué from the Tehran summit captures the three countries' consensus and some points intended to allay Turkey's fears. It reiterates the position on the "sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic", the condemnation of all forms of terrorism but also the condemnation of "illegitimate self-government initiatives", an almost direct reference to the Kurds.

Of particular importance is the "opposition to the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to Syria", which refers to the way the US treats oil fields and extraction facilities in Kurdish-controlled areas.

At the same time, the reference that in Northern Syria "security and stability in the region can only be achieved on the basis of maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country" makes it clear that the way out given to the Kurds is to renounce any plans for an autonomous entity and participate in the political process for tomorrow's inside Syria.

It is no coincidence, however, that against the backdrop of Turkey's threats of a new military operation on Syrian territory, there have been understandings between the Kurdish-controlled "Syrian Democratic Forces" and Syrian government forces, in order to reinforce the presence of government forces in areas controlled by the Kurds

Of particular importance, despite its importance, is point 13 of the joint communiqué, which states that in addition to the situation in Syria, the three countries "reaffirmed their intention to strengthen their trilateral coordination in various fields in order to promote political and economic cooperation", which points to something quite close to the kind of "Eurasian integration" that Russia and Iran in particular seem to be pushing for.

Besides, it is no coincidence that on the same day a $40 billion deal was signed between Russia's Gazprom and Iran's National Iranian Oil Company, a deal of wider significance considering that Russia has the largest gas reserves and Iran the next largest.

Source: in.gr


Contents of this article including associated images are belongs Cyprus Times
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or Cyprus Times

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