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[Cyprus Times] War in Ukraine: turning point or consolidation of correlation?

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War in Ukraine Turning point or consolidation of correlation? Russia is building relations with those countries that insist on a more multipolar world

The counter-offensive by the armed forces of Ukraine in the northeastern part of the front is seen by several sides as the move that could be a turning point in the evolution of warfare. This assessment has been reinforced by the way in which several voices in Russia, including Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, have been critical of the handling of the leadership of the Russian armed forces and, indirectly, of Vladimir Putin himself.

However, there are also assessments that believe that in order to assess the impact of this move, in addition to having all the data on its outcome, the specifics of these wars need to be taken seriously into account.

The specific characteristics of the war in Ukraine

The military operations had certain specific characteristics from the outset.

First of all, the very designation of the operations by the Russian side as a "Special Military Operation" was not some euphemism on the part of Russia. It also corresponded to how the Kremlin actually saw the operation.

That is, Russia did not launch an operation to occupy all of Ukraine, but a "special military operation" in order (a) to secure Donbass - in its entirety - and (b) to ensure the neutrality of Ukraine, possibly with a regime change in Kiev. This also explains how Russian forces reached outside Kiev more for pressure.

When this was not possible, and why the Kiev government did not accept these terms, and why the Western powers felt there was potential for, if not a defeat for Russia, at least significant damage that would increase resentment against Putin himself (probably on the scale of overthrowing him).



The failure to achieve the initial objectives and the risks of heavy losses of Russian forces led to a change in tactics, with a greater emphasis on capturing the areas of the Donbass that had remained under Ukrainian control in areas of the South, from Mariupol to Kherson.

This was combined with the systematic bombardment, using aircraft, rockets and artillery shells, of Ukrainian military infrastructure.

The peculiarity of the front

Unlike in other regions where the effect of warfare is to occupy areas whose location or geomorphology makes them important and allows them to be fortified positions in themselves or positions that can be converted into fortifications, in Ukraine we are dealing with large areas of flat land, with the only natural boundaries being riverbeds. The only fortified positions are cities, where the defenders can hold out for a long time and this explains the fighting around populated areas. The front line is very long and not supported by geomorphological features. This means that it is also easier to "break". On such a front it is often preferable to retreat rather than encirclement which can have many casualties and regroup. This seemed to be the tactic of the Russian forces both in the south and especially in the northeast. Probably this also had the prospect of encircling in a second time the one who breaks the front.

The characteristics of the opposing sides

Of particular importance are the traits of the opposing armed forces.Russia has brought large forces into the region, but not an "all-out campaign" and has relied heavily on its superior firepower and in an attempt to avoid casualties. And this corresponds to the concept of a "special military operation."

In contrast, Ukraine, a country of 44 million people, has engaged in a military panic. Obviously not all of its armed forces are equally formidable - for example, several units with experience in the enduring conflicts in Donbass have suffered heavy losses now - but quantitatively they are significant. Also, some of them have now also undergone training involving Western trainers. Most importantly, there is a steady flow of weapons from the West, including HIMARS batteries that have increased strikes behind Russian lines, as well as strikes to create civilian insecurity.

This allows Ukrainian forces to be able to concentrate forces for targeted counter-attacks, with the particular characteristics of the theatre of operations and the front itself, and to take advantage of volume, casualty-tolerance and Western equipment. This seems to be happening at this stage, especially in the northeast.

Of course, at the same time Russia is doing what it can to inflict significant casualties while insisting on "revenge" bombing of Ukrainian positions and infrastructure.

Reversal of correlation?

On this basis it would be quite premature to talk about a reversal of correlation. There is certainly a symbolic and real setback for the Russian forces. The shift to the need to defend areas that had been under control, such as in Kherson, or the withdrawal from areas creates delays in "integration" plans, e.g. by holding local referendums. However, they can hardly lose the bulk of the territory they have occupied so far, and have plenty of room to fight back and continue to destroy Ukraine's weapons and infrastructure.

Moreover, despite the continued supply of weapons to Ukraine - although the scale has been reduced by some countries - this does not negate the significant losses on the Ukrainian side. Nor do the Ukrainian forces seem at the moment to be able to achieve reversals along the entire front line.

Another important point is that so far at least, in the areas that have passed into the control of the Russian and "People's Democracy" forces, there does not seem to be a very large resistance movement against the Russian forces.

Weakened Putin?

One side of any assessment of the balance of power is that of the situation inside Russia and the position of Putin and the strategy he represents.

There one could observe that regardless of whatever criticisms there have been lately and despite the existing fatigue from the effects of the war, there does not seem to be a large wave of discontent against Putin. Nor does it seem so likely that he could be overthrown by a "palace coup".

Let us not forget that Russia will have a rather small reduction in its GDP, as it has all this time continued to export gas and oil to all the countries that have not imposed sanctions.

Besides, a significant part of the world considers that it can have economic relations with Russia, including countries such as China and India, which was evident at the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok from 5 to 8 September.

The situation of the Ukrainian armed forces

At the same time, the situation of the Ukrainian armed forces still has the contradiction between the large numbers of available manpower, the understandable fervour implied by the fact that these are soldiers defending national territory, the existence of Western weaponry with the fact that they do not have the same experience, nor the same training, nor the same overall firepower as the Russian forces.

What is the horizon for peace?

At this stage it is difficult to say what the horizon of the conflict is. Based on current data, a total reversal of the balance of power seems difficult, not excluding further Ukrainian counter-attacks, but these seem likely to be met with escalating destruction of civilian rather than military infrastructure. The Russian attacks on electricity infrastructure on Sunday 11 September are indicative.

At the same time, the morale of the forces in the West that insist on a goal of defeating Russia seems to be recovering, which means that the flow of arms will continue, while everything indicates that the European countries are moving towards taking the interruption of the flow of Russian gas to Europe for granted. Indeed, one can even expect in the immediate future an increase in the flow of arms to Ukraine from European countries as well, although countries such as Germany still refuse to send armoured tanks.

However, this possibility of a Russian "defeat" still goes through certain difficulties, especially as regards the dimension of total reversal.

At the same time, it is clear that the way in which the hostility between the West and Russia is now polarised means that it is difficult in the short term to have initiatives for political negotiation and a way out of war violence.

It seems far more likely on all sides that there will be maximum investment in correlation formation on the ground of warfare itself. Only this means prolonging the war and its tragic consequences.

Source: in.gr


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Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or Cyprus Times

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