The use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by Russian forces in Ukraine has ceased to be taboo in Russian society.
The problems of equipping Russian troops with "domestically manufactured drones" leave the Russian military to operate mostly Iranian drones, Al Monitor reports in an analysis.
The use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by Russian forces in Ukraine has ceased to be taboo in Russian society.
The use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by Russian forces in Ukraine has ceased to be taboo in Russian society.
Officials continue to call reports of Iranian drone deliveries to Russia "fake news," but the Russian press writes about them freely and without hesitation, despite current laws prohibiting the dissemination of military information that contradicts what is official.
Moreover, even the Russian Defense Ministry an agency whose representatives unhesitatingly call any major military retreat "reconstruction" has begun to acknowledge problems in equipping troops with Russian drones. Thus, in late September, Colonel Igor Ishuk, a Defense Ministry spokesman, bluntly stated that most Russian UAVs do not meet tactical and technical requirements.
According to media reports in the country, the Russian military is using Iranian UAVs to strike targets both on the front lines and deep inside Ukrainian territory at ranges of tens of kilometers. However, according to the same Russian military officials Al-Monitor spoke to, expectations that the Shahed-136 kamikaze drones will be used en masse against mobile Ukrainian artillery brigades with US HIMARS rocket artillery systems and M777 mortars and French CAESAR shells have yet to materialize.
The lack of precision guided weapons, limitations in the operation of attack aircraft in the operational depths of Ukraine's defenses, and problems with the quality and quantity of technical reconnaissance equipment force the Russian military to use Iranian UAVs mainly as a replacement for cruise missiles and tactical missiles for strikes against static targets that do not require reconnaissance. In particular, it is known that Shahed-136 munitions along with Lancet-3 "Russian kamikaze drones" were used to strike an air defense command post a fuel storage facility in Ochakov and the headquarters of the Southern Operational Command in Odessa.
Overall, the Ukrainian war not only highlighted many problems within the Russian military, which at the time of the invasion of Ukraine relied heavily on the experience of the Syrian campaign, but also led Russian generals and officers into relationships with the Iranians, from the category of instructors to the category of trainees. Due to the huge and, more importantly, unplanned consumption of ammunition, the Russian military is also interested in replenishing its stocks with shells and bullets of various calibres, produced serially in Iranian factories.
It is possible that Russia will attempt to correct its position, and present its current dependence on Iran as a temporary necessity.
It is possible that Russia will attempt to correct its position, and present its current dependence on Iran as a temporary necessity. For example, Moscow could offer Tehran joint programs to modernize existing drone models, pointing out weaknesses such as low speed, which, logically, should be corrected. But here too the Kremlin is capable of falling into a trap. If Russian imports of Iranian UAVs do not bother Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or Israel much, nevertheless the joint Russian-Iranian modernization of drones, based on the experience of a large-scale rather than localized conflict, will be painfully perceived, even taking into account the limited industrial capabilities of Russian enterprises specializing in UAV production.
Source: skai.gr
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