A New York Times analysis attempts to trace the deeper causes behind the courtship of the two authoritarian presidents
In a lengthy article in the New York Times, Stephen Erlanger goes into an in-depth analysis of the significance of the meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan - whom he describes as unstable - and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, both in terms of relations between the two countries and in terms of Turkey's place in NATO.
As he points out, Erdogan faces political difficulties ahead of next year's elections at a time when the Turkish economy is collapsing, with the central bank's reserves of foreign currency nearly drying up and inflation hovering around 80 percent annually.
The shared challenges are, in the Times analyst's view, the reason the two presidents have become closer than ever before. The two have met twice in the past three weeks, with their latest meeting in Sochi, Russia, broadening their partnership. According to Erdogan, the two have agreed to an economic partnership that he hopes will total $100 billion.
Upset at NATO
The relationship is causing consternation among Erdogan's NATO allies, as the Turkish president is effectively offering Putin a significant loophole in the sanctions barrier the West has struggled to build to end the war in Ukraine. Some, Erlanger observes, wonder what Erdogan's real alliances are, and whether he is interested in anything beyond his own interests.
What is almost certain, however, is that for now their bond is beneficial to both, based on the details of their agreement that are coming to light. For Putin, the benefit lies in the opportunity to sell energy and arms, make investments and strengthen ties with a NATO member at a time when the latter is trying to isolate him.
Precious loophole
Turkey has refused to impose sanctions against Russia. In fact, it is looking for ways to cooperate with Russian banks that have been sanctioned and accept payments from Russian credit cards. Russian gas flows continue without problems from the TurkStram pipeline and there are reports that Russia is seeking Turkish help in finding subsystems for its armaments, since it is no longer able to buy components directly from the West.
For Erdogan, the benefits lie in money flows to his central bank, cheap energy, his country's global importance, cooperation with a major export market, a boost to its tourism industry and, most importantly, Russian support for his efforts - which are politically lucrative - to crush the Kurds in Syria, where Russia supports the official government of Bashar al-Assad.
Competition
But the friendship between the two leaders is marked by clear elements of competition, the Times analysis continues, which is to be expected since it has developed between two authoritarian leaders with superpowers. When they met in Tehran last month, Erdogan left Putin standing alone for nearly a minute as the Russian leader, notorious for his habit of "standing up" to his counterparts, stared uncomfortably at the cameras.
The move was interpreted as a subtle reminder of the shift in the balance of power between them and an attempt by Erdogan to maintain the upper hand in their partnership. Putin, after all, has also stood up to Erdogan in the past. Increasingly, the relationship between the two countries is dependent on the relations between the two men. The talks between the authoritarian leaders are generally kept secret, and it seems that even the Turkish Foreign Ministry has no clear picture of their details."
"Turkish foreign policy has entered a very dangerous period," argues Ilhan Uzgel, a political scientist who taught international relations at Ankara University before being fired by presidential decree, speaking to The Times. "The two leaders have come together and are engaged in a negotiation. But only the two of them, in a palace, and few still know its contents."
Putin's delight, NATO's irritation
Erdogan has bought advanced Russian anti-aircraft missile systems that undermine NATO's security, and was the only one to move against Sweden and Finland joining the alliance. For now, he has lifted his objections, but more dramatic moves are expected before the Turkish parliament votes to approve their entry in the autumn.
This stance certainly makes Putin, who has long warned the northern states not to join NATO, happy.
Washington is watching developments closely, officially stating that "we have encouraged Turkey not to become a safe haven for illicit Russian assets or transactions" and urging Turkey to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. The statement also noted that Turkey supports Ukrainian national sovereignty and territorial integrity and that Erdogan has called the Russian invasion "unacceptable."
Western benefits from Turkish game
Indeed, Turkey has opposed the Russian invasion of Ukraine, banning Russian warships from entering the Black Sea and selling arms to Kiev, including advanced drones that have been used against Russian soldiers.
For the West, Erdogan's ability to work with Putin is not entirely negative. Turkey has maintained close diplomatic ties with Moscow and acts as a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine over grain deliveries and potential peace talks. Erdogan and his top aides talk with both Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, several times a week.
"Erdogan is keeping all his options open, which is what countries tend to do when they think only of their own interests - which allies don't," Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. envoy to NATO, told the Times. "He has found a way to play his game, but he does so at the expense of an alliance that is critical to his country's security."
A NATO ally on good terms with Putin is an asset, Daalder added, "to the extent that he says the right things, tries to resolve issues in a way that is consistent with the goals of the alliance and doesn't undermine it."
Erdogan's goals
Erdogan's central goal, according to Turkish analysts, is his re-election and he is seeking help both for his country's economy and in trying to fight what he sees as Kurdish terrorism in Syria and within his own country.
"The goal of Erdogan's government is not to help Putin, it is to create the right conditions for itself to win the election," Uzgel observes."
"Erdogan has three concerns," he continues. "First, to tell the West that he can do business with Putin. Second, he expects the money coming from Russia to temporarily improve the exchange rate. Third, he wants to agree with Russia on some possible attack he wants to launch on Syria."
Erdogan is not doing well in the polls, with elections scheduled for June next year. His biggest problems stem from the disastrous economic picture and the exhaustion and anger of the population from the millions of refugees remaining in the country.
Pro-Ukraine but not anti-Russia
"On both issues, Putin is holding Erdogan's hand," notes the European Council on Foreign Relations' Ashley Aididasbas. Russia is a source of hard currency, cheap energy and jobs, she explains, and all it takes is a few Russian bombings in northern Syria to bring another two million refugees to the Turkish border.
Regional security threats such as the precarious ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh - where Turkey supports Azerbaijan and Russia supports Armenia - mean that any Turkish government would be forced to seek a balanced cooperative relationship with Russia, underlines Sinan Ulgen, director of EDAM, a Turkish research institute.
"Turkey needs a diplomatic alliance with Russia in our neighbourhood, given crisis areas such as Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, it cannot afford to isolate Russia," Ulgen explains."
Erdogan's ability to bring Russian and Ukrainian ministers to the same table and broker a deal to transport Ukrainian - and Russian - grain from the Black Sea "vindicates Turkey's balanced stance towards Russia. Turkey is pro-Ukraine without being anti-Russia."
"The only alternative is war."
As he tells the Times, Turkish officials "are also aware of the fine line between not applying sanctions and creating an image that the country is helping Russia avoid sanctions."
The Putin-Erdoğan relationship is a strange one, with the two countries "openly cooperating but also fighting proxy wars" in Syria and Libya, while Turkey needs the Russians' reluctant agreement to attack Syria's Kurds and maintain the tense ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Aididasbas argues.
"No one in Ankara is happy that Russia controls areas to the north of the Turkish side in the Black Sea or to the south in Syria, but they understand that they should negotiate a relationship with Russia and establish a modus vivendi," he explains. "The only alternative is war."
Source: in.gr
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