"To Vima" reveals five new key facts about the wiretapping case, about the connections and the unknown movements of the protagonists of the case that is preoccupying public opinion
At the back, towards the side of Ymittos, of the two-storey building of the NIS facilities in Agia Paraskevi, which was intended to house intelligence units for "cyber security", the illegal software Predato[/B]r was installed and operated in the period, mainly, 2020 -2022, which allegedly monitored dozens of politicians, journalists, businessmen and other individuals!
In this particular area, police officers were present who had been transferred to the EEAS, mainly from the Organized Crime Sub-Directorate of the Security Service of Attica, but also from other police services. The names of all the police officers, such as Christos H., Elias K., Panagiotis T., Ioannis Gr., Kostas P. (some with the rank of sergeant, policeman, etc.), and others who had been activated around the Predator in critical positions are available to the newspaper. Some of them have returned in a timely manner, in recent weeks, to EL.AS. services after the revelation of the case.
This group that had managed Predator was reportedly headed by an EL.AS. officer who had many years of presence in the aforementioned police service and other security services. This particular officer had been placed in critical posts in the NIS with responsibility for controlling the system of "legal syncroasis" after mediation by another member of the EL.AS. with whom she had long-standing contacts. This police officer was a close associate of the businessman Yannis Lavranos who was allegedly involved in the negotiations for the activation of this software in our country. Moreover, the officer in question, who also signed the request for the surveillance of the president of Pasok-KINAL, Nikos Androulakis, was considered to be the closest associate of the then commander of the NIS, Panagiotis Kontoleontos.
Mr. Kontoleon, in turn, was the personal choice of former close associate of the Prime Minister Gregory Dimitriadis, for whom there was even a relevant legislative regulation because he did not have the necessary education to take the relevant post. Kontoleon maintained constant contact, according to testimonies available to the newspaper, with Lavrano, with visits to the latter's office in Neo Psychiko. In a triangle that consisted of Lavrano, Kontoleon and the EL.AS. officer in question, who essentially allegedly participated in the installation or some of them in the installation and management of the software to hijack all the data from mobile phones of dozens of targets.
"To Vima" reveals five new key facts about the wiretapping case, about the connections and the unknown movements of the protagonists of the case that is preoccupying public opinion. In a series of reports that highlight many aspects of the case and the full context of the reported scandal. Elements that have not yet been thoroughly investigated by the relevant parliamentary committees or even by the judicial officials who are continuing the initial collection of evidence.
1. The first processes for the activation of the Predator
In a building in Halandri, which houses, among other things, a company promoting weapons systems and the construction of speedboats, the first contacts of the Israeli businessman Sahak Avni, manufacturer and seller of the Predator, with Greek businessmen and Yannis Lavranos (seller of the communications system of the Greek National Police) were hosted.AS) and Felix Biggio (CEO of an American group owned by a Greek shipowner), who was a friend and former business partner of the latter. Some meetings were also attended, in a second phase, by the commander of the NSA Panagiotis Kontoleon, with eyewitnesses to these meetings - mainly at Lavranos' office in Neo Psychiko - private individuals involved in the first investigative contacts, who may be summoned by the judicial authorities. What has impressed people who knew people and situations were the invitations to Kontoleontas for immediate presence in Lavranos' office and the response of the NIS commander, as well as the close cooperation between the two men.
2. The unknown acquaintances and the interventions of Lavranos and Bitziou
C. Lavranos had managed to have access to and contacts in state agencies and with the governments of both New Democracy and SYRIZA. In 2014 he managed to sell the Sepura communications system to the EL.AS. in the form of a virtual donation in order to undertake its over-profitable maintenance. At the time, the current Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, who seems to have been targeted by Predator, stood in the way of this method. However, he found other supporters within the then ruling party, some of whom were former heads of audit services, but also an important executive of a state-owned company for the exploitation of Olympic facilities.
With the return of New Democracy to power in the summer of 2019, his earlier long-standing acquaintance with the nephew of Prime Minister Gregory Dimitriadis seems to have been activated. And this seems to have been only a small sample of Labrano's interventionist capabilities. He seems to have been "present" or to have expressed direct or indirect interest in other tenders for EL.AS supplies. and the Ministry of National Defence. Two of them concerned Pentagon procurements for the purchase of two systems (with a total value of approximately 6,000,000 euros) for the recording of mobile moments, tracking in specific locations and analysis of movements and connections of "targets" from open (such as the Internet) and "closed" sources.
One of these tenders was cancelled last October, coinciding with the revelation of the wiretapping case.
One of these tenders was cancelled last October at the same time as the revelation of the wiretapping case. According to reports, Lavranos was also interested in participating in other ministry tenders, such as that of the Ministry of Defence for the Thorax operational system. This is a system consisting of sensors of existing infrastructure of the Greek state, while all kinds of sensors are used to collect information, such as radars, weather stations and other sources of external data acquisition, as well as AI applications in cyberspace.
Indicative of the multifaceted activity of this businessman and his associates was that Mr. Bitzios appeared, according to testimonies of EL.AS officials, and in the tender process for the supply of an anti-drone system, costing more than 2 million euros, which was to be installed in the Parliament, the Megaron Maximou and other government buildings. It is noted that officers of the Hellenic Police who handled these procurements when they were informed that there was an issue with illegal eavesdropping by the National Security Service and the name of these businessmen (who participated in critical tenders of the security authorities) was mentioned, they resorted to the Communications Privacy Authority to find out if their phones were also tapped! But their fears were not confirmed.
3. Predator's first targets
When it was decided, after consultations in the offices of companies in Chalandri and Psychiko, the "invisible" sale of the Predator system to the NIS, the main initial target was a foreigner employed for state security issues. This person knew how to avoid investigations by the secret services but also how to mislead them by reporting false information in conversations with his relatives. He even caused false alarms to the Greek services who were initially under the illusion that they were gathering useful information on similar issues.
This is because he probably knew that he was being monitored by the legal interception system, which was able to record the conversations only through mobile phone providers and not through online platforms that Predator could record by sending a "trojan horse" link. However, quickly and from the first targets with national criteria, the use of this software... veered off in other directions with surveillance of Greek politicians, journalists, etc., serving diverse interests.
4. How Predator was paid for and the connection with the NSA's legal interception system
Initially there were reports that the Predator system, costing around €7 million, was purchased by a businessman who had connections with people involved in the negotiations and had good contacts with political figures. However, information is now being investigated that the payment for Predator was made through overcharging and other related amounts for the purchase of a new legal interception system acquired, at the same time, by the NSA from an Italian company that appears to have had Lavrano as its silent representative. He did not deny in private discussions this participation and the assumption of the maintenance of the new "Italian" system of legal syncrosis for a long period of time.
What is of particular importance, however, are reports to "To Vima" by representatives of other companies that participated in the tender in question.
As they note, "there was a suffocating space of a few days for the competing companies to submit their proposals. Almost all proposals were rejected because the representatives of the other companies did not meet the pressing deadlines to submit translated versions of the hundreds of necessary documents. As they added, "they submitted a question to those in charge of the EEAS as to why there were these stifling time limits for no real reason and the answer they received was that 'it was the wish of the then head of the EEAS, Panagiotis Kontoleontos'". Adding that their bids that were ultimately not opened were far below the purchase cost, which was curiously exorbitant.
However, judicial officials will also investigate information that there was a "lump sum" sublease and against... sets of illegal Predator hearings. Given that the Israeli developers-sellers of the software in question, Tal Dillian and Sahak Avni, would also have had the facility for their company Intellexa to establish itself in Greece in order to have a base for its export activities from our country. This is after a series of difficulties and entanglements that existed in Cyprus with their investigated business activities. It is not coincidental, of course, of these associations that Mr. Bitzios was found to be a shareholder of Intellexa and some of its associated companies and his associate Elias Kyriakides as the company's accountant.
5. They were involved in the management of the illegal software
At the end of 2019, about 30 civilian employees, mainly from technical services, were present at the premises of the NIS in Agia Paraskevi (near the exit of Attiki Street), who were removed unexpectedly. The first building housed the Technology Support, Development and Innovation Centre (KETYAK) that has been created within the NIS. Of central interest and with the aim of establishing and operating the National Cyber Security Operational Centre, with a budget of 40.4 million euros, the NIS has been established. The money for this project (the amount is considered excessive and the reported interventions in various government agencies unclear) has not yet been paid. In the second building in Agia Paraskevi, however, there was, initially, a short-day training of some NIS "listeners" on the operation of the new surveillance system. A group of at least five to seven police officers who had been transferred to the NSI under the guidance of the officer mentioned above, who had personal contacts with an associate of Lavranos and who seems to have been considered a person of absolute trust, were present there (there have also been reports of renting an apartment).
These persons seem to have been trained in 2019-2020 in the use of the Predator by Israelis who had come from Cyprus based on the "deals" in Chalandri and Psychiko. As other state service officials note, "during that period, the officer in question and her close group of collaborators from the ELAS who had been seconded to the secret services had disappeared for many months from the building on Katehaki Avenue. We were asking where the police officer in question was, since her responsibilities included physical surveillance and other critical investigations. But no answer was given by top intelligence officials. But now that the facts have changed, it seems that the explanation for her non-appearance on Katehaki Avenue had to do with her presence at the secret service premises in Agia Paraskevi in central consultation with EIA administrators and another closed circle of people."
On the basis of these testimonies, the peculiar, as it initially appeared, complementary monitoring of the cell phones of the President of PASOK Nikos Androulakis and journalist Thanasis Koukakis with the interception system of the EIS and the illegal software Predator are allegedly explained. Typically, the head of the legal interception department of the EIS, who co-signed the request for surveillance of Mr Androulakis, was the same officer who seems to have been involved in the handling of Predator in Agia Paraskevi, who was considered a close associate of the aforementioned.
It is noted that four days ago "To Vima" submitted a request to the officer in question for the reported handling of the software in question without any response.
Finally, the question is what has happened to the equipment of the illegal software. Some reports indicate that it has been transferred to offices of related companies (Intellexa's offices in Elliniko have been closed three months ago) or to other private premises in the wider area of Pharos Psychiko that have a strong surveillance system with cameras.
Source: Print Vima Kyriaki Kyriaki
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