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[Cyprus Times] How Ukraine seized more territory in five days than Russia did in five months

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Five crucial days seem to have been enough for the Ukrainian forces to completely change the scenery of the war

The Russian army is losing at least one battalion a day, as the double Ukrainian counter-offensive erases Moscow's territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine.

In numbers, that means hundreds of deaths and dozens of vehicles destroyed daily: devastating losses for Russia, since its army was barely maintaining just over 100 battalions in Ukraine, before the Ukrainian counter-offensive in the south began on 30 August and in the east of the country eight days later.

In less than two weeks of fierce fighting, the Ukrainians destroyed, severely damaged or seized 1,200 Russian tanks and combat vehicles, trucks, helicopters, warplanes and drones, according to the Ukrainian General Staff of the Army. Independent analysts, scouring social media for photos and videos, have confirmed about 400 incidents.

According to Kiev officials, about 5,500 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since August 29. It is possible that the Ukrainians are exaggerating the number of dead, however the most recent US estimate of Russian manpower losses was very close to that of the Ukrainians.

Five key days seem to have been enough for Ukrainian forces to completely change the landscape of the war. An operation by Ukrainian forces that began as a push on one part of the front ended in a 43.5-mile (70 km) advance - and continues.

An analysis by the Institute for the Study of War says of Ukrainian forces that in the space of five days they captured "more territory than Russian forces have managed in all their operations since April."

Until last week Ukraine was facing enormous difficulties and progress in its offensive operations was being made with great difficulty. However, it dynamically exploited the military conditions in the region southeast of Kharkiv, opening up the prospect of further gains.

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Russia's "fatal" moves

According to this analysis, Russia's decision to send thousands of its best troops to defend Kherson seems to have been both "fatal" and decisive for the course of the war.

Exhausted Russian soldiers, after months of continuous warfare, created the right conditions for the Ukrainian forces to regain their lost territory.

The most recent offensive appears to be the second stage of a double counter-offensive, first in Kherson and then in Kharkiv. One way or another, Ukraine had been quietly building up forces in the north to strike against defenders partly of the Rosgvardia National Guard, the separatist forces from Lugansk.

Ukrainian forces first surrounded Balakliia, a town 45 miles southeast of Kharkiv, then pushed north to reach the Oskil River south of the railway and the Kupiansk supply hub, and then entered the town. This cut off Izium, a key military centre in the south, and prompted the Russians to abandon a city that was captured in late March.

Key Ukrainian moves

Ukraine's success was achieved in part by using both tanks and infantry on a front where the enemy was weakened by long-range artillery strikes (probably from US and other MLRS missile launchers).

He did particularly clever planning to locate Russia's weak point and exploited the geography - the river - to maximum advantage. But above all, it made proper and powerful use of combined arms, the like of which has not been seen since the invasion began.

Russia had proceeded thinking that it could, by the incessant use of heavy artillery - 15,000 to 20,000 shells a day - cut off the Ukrainian forces to the west. Now it suddenly seems that Moscow has spent months engaged in a conflict that at first yielded only limited gains - Sievierodonetsk - and then almost nothing, as it failed to capture Bakhmut.

The most recent battle for Izium shows how limited the invaders' presence is now. The overall quality of Russia's forces has been gradually degraded to about 100,000 troops, who are rarely rotated to recover and must cover the vast Ukrainian front. Air force movements also remain limited.

At the same time, because the Kremlin refuses to talk about "war" in Ukraine, using the term "military operation," Moscow can mobilize limited additional resources.

However, it is unclear how far Ukraine can sustain its momentum. The combination of smart strategy, weapons and training provided by the West appears to be finally paying off, but too much forward momentum carries risks.

On the other hand, maps released by Russia's Defense Ministry on Sunday show that it plans to retreat to the Oskil River line along the Kharkiv, and it remains unclear whether the front will consolidate there.

What Ukraine should exploit

Ukraine can now target supply lines in northern Lugansk province. A Russian loss of Izium may relieve pressure on Sloviansk from the northwest and allow Ukraine to try to reverse the losses suffered in Donbass, starting in the direction of Lysychansk.

At the same time, there is a potential opportunity to make progress around Kherson in the south, where Russia is likely to need to withdraw its forces.

In the meantime, the further political fallout that may occur remains critical. Barring recent events on the battlefield, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to definitively defeat Russia before winter sets in. However, Kiev has shown the difference that Western support can and could make in the coming year, removing potential external criticism as energy price increases will be significant this winter.

Morale in Ukraine remains high and its political goals are general: to regain all territory, demand reparations from Russia and secure a war crimes tribunal. Points which the Kremlin does not yet seem willing to concede.

However, Vladimir Putin and the leadership of the Russian military face serious questions. How they react could determine whether the war they themselves declared will be won by Russia.

Source: in.gr


Contents of this article including associated images are belongs Cyprus Times
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or Cyprus Times

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