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[Cyprus Times] How close is a new war in the Balkans?

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How close is a new war in the Balkans?

You can call it a "license plate conflict", or not. Two weeks ago, media around the world extensively covered the brief outbreak of protests in northern Kosovo.

A resumption of a dispute regarding traffic signs led Serbs to block the roads and forced the Kosovo authorities to briefly close two border crossings into Serbia.

Kosovo police also reported that an unknown number of attackers fired at them, although there were no injuries, and some Serb protesters reportedly beat up some drivers who tried to overtake the roadblocks. The protests began on July 31, but ended on August 1.

Depending on your perspective and the media you choose to cover, the incident was either too bad for nothing or a harbinger of a potential return to ethnic conflict, as Stratfor points out in an extensive analysis and reproduced by euro2day.

However, as is often the case when putting events into context, the flare-up should not be dismissed and deserves real attention, but it also does not suggest that Kosovo, or the wider Balkan region, is in imminent danger of slipping into widespread violence as it did in the 1990s. Instead, the license plate controversy is a symptom of a much larger challenge - unresolved national identity politics - which compels us as analysts to consider the risks, but also the broader context in which they exist.

The ghost of the Balkans' past

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The July 31 protests were certainly not unprecedented. The dispute has been simmering since September 2021, when the Kosovo authorities first announced that they would not renew a ten-year-old agreement with Serbia to recognize its license plates in Kosovo. Kosovo authorities downplayed the decision, saying the change was simply in line with rules issued by Belgrade, which does not recognize that Kosovo's unification risks destabilizing the Balkans.

However, a "foretaste" of the latest flare-up was when Serbs in northern Kosovo temporarily blocked border crossings, with sporadic reports of low-level violence on the streets, before Kosovo authorities lifted the ban and the situation de-escalated.

While the dispute is ostensibly about traffic signs, however, it touches on much deeper divisions that explain why the measure has caused these flare-ups. Although several peace agreements ended the fighting and multiple conflicts that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, they nonetheless left many fundamental issues - most of which involve questions of national identity - unresolved. As one of the biggest regional flashpoints, the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia touches on two underlying challenges.

First, there is the aforementioned question of the legitimacy of Kosovo's independence. The dispute is theoretically political and could, in theory, reach some form of settlement. But it also has an ethnic dimension because the vast majority of Kosovo's population is ethnically Albanian and Muslim, while Serbia's is largely ethnically Serb and Christian.

Added to this division is the fact that more than half of Kosovo's Serb minority is concentrated in the northernmost region of Mitrovica, which borders Serbia, making it ethnically distinct from the rest of Kosovo and explaining why protests over the billboard dispute have been concentrated there. The situation is further complicated by the fact that smaller groups of Serb minorities are scattered in pockets throughout the rest of Kosovo.

Numerous academic studies have examined the question of whether ethnic conflicts are really about competing identities or whether they are actually covert disputes over other issues, such as political power and access to natural resources. However, the fact remains that such conflicts can cause serious divisions, particularly when ethnic differences and substantive grievances overlap.

In the Balkans, this is partly due to the history of the region. After all, Yugoslavia - whether we are talking about the pre-World War II kingdom or the communist federation that followed it - was always held together by a strong central leader, not because of any logical unity among the various peoples inhabiting the region. Thus, it is not surprising that the wars (and war crimes) of the 1990s, which included the breakup of Yugoslavia, were fought primarily along ethnic lines, thus reinforcing the fundamental importance of cultural identities.

Since then, Balkan leaders from across the political spectrum have often invoked ethnicities over nationalities, thus keeping personal identities at the heart of society. This has meant that many aspects of everyday life-everything from political debates to license plates-still have ethnic significance. Even measures designed to assuage ethnic concerns, such as ethnic quotas for government positions in many countries, have kept identity politics at the centre and in some cases exacerbated tensions.

As tragic evidence of the paramount importance of identity politics, even highly unlikely threats risk triggering ethnic unrest in the Balkans. For example, there has long been speculation about the creation of a "Greater Albania" that would incorporate the majority Albanian population of Kosovo into Albania itself. Politicians in both countries have come out in favour and polls suggest that citizens on both sides of the border would, in theory, be amenable to the idea.

However, the concept of a "Greater Albania" has been largely relegated to the periphery, as it is widely believed that the creation of such a state would face potentially insurmountable legal challenges, practical objections to implementation, and unpopular economic and political changes. However, even so, mere discussion of the idea has raised concerns from Serbia and has raised concerns about the negative effects in other Balkan countries with large Albanian minorities - which have maintained a focus on ethnic divisions.

In this regard, while the tensions between Kosovo and Serbia that recently made news were of an ethnic hue, arguably the greatest threat of unrest is in Bosnia and Herzegovina - another Balkan country with a large and troubled Serbian minority. There, decentralized governance is effectively divided into two largely autonomous entities: the predominantly Bosnian-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska. This cumbersome system - which also includes a tripartite presidency (one from each of the three main ethnic groups) at the national level - was established in the 1995 Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war. While the US-brokered peace agreement resolved the three-year war, it did so at the cost of creating an unsustainable governance structure that has effectively paralysed the country and entrenched ethnic discrimination.

This has resulted in several escalations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, most recently triggered by the country's leading Serb politician, Milorad Dodik. Dodik leads the Republika Srpska and often engages in cynical political appeals to ethnic divisions. Most worryingly, he has repeatedly threatened to remove the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina's national institutions - a move that would directly undermine the fragile post-war peace. As evidence of this threat, earlier this year the United States and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Dodik on charges related to threatening the stability of both his country and the wider region.

Looking to the West

But despite press headlines questioning whether the Balkans are headed for another war, these recent flashpoints have led to more of a whimper than a big bang. This is largely because, despite their differences, the Balkan states share a desire for deeper integration into Europe, and in many ways depend on Western financial funding and in some cases security guarantees.

Most importantly, each country in the region is either already an EU member (Croatia and Slovenia), an official "candidate country" in ongoing negotiations with Brussels (Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), or a "potential candidate country" for EU membership (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Thus, all Balkan states have a strong incentive to keep the peace, as any turn to violence would jeopardize their accession process and the many benefits they hope to reap by joining the European Union.

The European Union is already the main economic partner for the regional countries, with Brussels and individual EU countries accounting for most of the trade and much of the economic aid flowing to the Balkans.

The European Union is already the main economic partner for the regional countries, with Brussels and individual EU countries accounting for most of the trade and much of the economic aid flowing to the Balkans. Therefore, straining EU relations by engaging in conflict is not just a theoretical, long-term concern, but one that would have direct consequences for the Balkan economies as well.

Combined with the historical political and economic influence of the United States, the European Union's influence in the Balkans is a critical lever that has repeatedly helped calm tensions. Moreover, the presence of EU and NATO peacekeepers, advisers and trainers on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina keeps the conflict in what are arguably the two largest potential powder kegs in the region under control in a tangible way, both by preventing violence and ensuring that there is minimal unrest when flare-ups do occur.

Take for example the Serbia-Kosovo dispute over traffic signs. It was political intervention by the EU and the US, supported by NATO peacekeepers in the region, that de-escalated tensions last September, as well as two weeks ago.

While the territorial dispute at the root of the issue is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, multinational pressure and historical precedent suggest that Kosovo will modify the license plate measure or delay its implementation again beyond September 1, when it is scheduled to take effect. This means that the dispute is likely to remain a stalemate, much more a problem to be managed than a crisis to be addressed. Indeed, for all their rhetorical grandstanding, neither Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti nor Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic have shown any serious appetite for real armed conflict, which would have significant costs for both countries, with little benefit. Instead, both leaders appear to be using appeals to national identity more as a way to rally domestic political support, build strong negotiating positions and, in some cases, extract concessions from the West - before finally backing down.

Moreover, consider that some Balkan states are taking steps to deepen regional integration. Indeed, ethnic and other disagreements have not prevented Albania and Serbia (along with North Macedonia and possibly others one day) from making plans to create a single market that would allow the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. While the process is admittedly slow and faces short-term challenges, it is certainly not the kind of policymaking that suggests these countries are planning for major conflicts.

Finally, what may seem like an intractable problem need not be so. Today's North Macedonia had a nearly three-decade-long dispute over its previous name, simply "Macedonia," which is also a region in Greece. For years, the dispute - which also featured arguments over national identity - was a source of regional instability.

Tensions with Greece over the name change also hindered Macedonia's (then) ambition to join NATO and the European Union, as neither bloc wanted to accept a country that had such an ongoing dispute with an existing member. Eventually, however, Athens and Skopje reached an agreement in 2018 whereby Macedonia became North Macedonia, facilitating its entry into NATO and making it an official candidate for EU membership in 2020 - something that clearly shows the underlying driving forces in favour of peace rather than conflict, even after years of rhetorical 'shots' and bickering in negotiations.

Source:Stratfor/with information from euro2day.gr


Contents of this article including associated images are belongs Cyprus Times
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or Cyprus Times

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