Why Pelosi's visit to Taiwan angers China In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, Pelosi's visit to Taiwan appears to be the beginning of an overall aggressive US strategy
Around the time he was landing at Taipei airport[/B], capital of Taiwan, the plane carrying U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi was "uploading" to the Washington Post's website an opinion piece explaining why this congressional delegation visit is taking place.
There Pelosi uses particularly aggressive language against China mainly on democracy and freedoms, on issues from Tibet to the recent protests in Hong Kong, not failing to mention that Beijing is committing "genocide against the Muslim Uighurs".
However, in one paragraph of her text, Pelosi does not fail to mention that her visit "does not contradict the long-standing One China policy guided by the 1970 Taiwan Relations Act, the US-China Joint Communiqués and the Six Assurances. The United States continues to oppose unilateral efforts to change the status quo in the region."
This statement was meant to emphasize that the U.S. has not changed its line on Taiwan since the relevant shift in the 1970s. That is, the US is not going to recognize Taiwan's independence (but is also not going to say that it is not an independent state), is generally supportive of reunification - but not supportive of how the People's Republic would see it - and maintains a position of "strategic ambiguity" as to whether to intervene militarily on Taiwan's behalf.
However, even so, it is obvious that for the Chinese leadership the move is a challenge and this explains the high tones with which it has responded.
China believes that the US wants to shape a crisis in its "backyard."
[BR][BR]The Chinese leadership has made no secret of the fact that it is pursuing reunification with Taiwan even in terms of coercion. It would like to see the one-country-two systems model that was also tried with Hong Kong applied here. This also has to do with the fact that the Communist Party of China has always been a patriotic-nationalist party.
At this stage, however, what the Chinese leadership is mainly interested in is not to change the status quo with Taiwan so that it can prepare better conditions for reunification.
In any case, if one observes China's foreign policy, one will see that it is based on a certain hierarchy. Although China has upgraded its international economic and diplomatic presence, it has nevertheless for the time being avoided major power projections abroad, except in areas it considers to be its zone of direct interest.
This concerns areas such as the South China Sea and obviously Taiwan (which China typically treats as part of its own territory). There it considers that it has the first say and any challenge to it will be hostile.
The Chinese leadership in recent years has invested heavily in acquiring not only economic power (it is already the world's second economy) but also a corresponding political-military power. But at the same time, it is clear that it would not want to get involved in "hot" conflicts that could undermine the effort to make the Chinese economy even more advanced.
At the same time, the Chinese leadership believes that the US is particularly invested in creating conditions of geopolitical crises and tensions in order to damage its rivals, crises that have costs and provide a pretext for sanctions against the Chinese economy.
This seems to be their reading of developments in Ukraine. Regardless of the extent to which they agreed with Russian tactics in Ukraine, the Chinese leadership saw the West's stance on the Ukrainian crisis as an aggressive move against Russia and a challenge to Beijing's self-evident respect for each country's "zones of influence". In short, if the US is threatening Russia's security by trying to expand NATO's influence in Ukraine, then it could do something similar in relation to Taiwan. That is, to treat Taiwan as a way to put even more pressure on China but also as a challenge to the sovereign rights that Beijing believes it has in Taiwan. In short, in China's eyes, Taiwan is being judged on whether the US and its allies will try to put dikes in Chinese strategy.
Of particular importance to the Chinese leadership is also that the US should not try to further stimulate those political forces within Taiwan that want to go ahead with independence and reject any prospect of reunification.
This also explains why they see Pelosi's visit as a break in US tactics and perhaps a harbinger of more negative developments. That is why they have chosen such strong and harsh rhetoric and various forms of military show of force.
Show of force
It is clear that the Chinese side will respond to Pelosi's visit by making a very clear show of force against both the US and those in Taiwan who believe there is a path other than reunification.
If one looks at China's already announced military exercises around Taiwan, one will see precisely that the show of force has the content that China is even preparing for the possibility of armed enforcement of unification when it believes that conditions exist.
At the same time it is also trying out practices that point to exerting great economic and political pressure on Taiwan itself and the forces within it that oppose reunification.
At the same time the message to the US is that any attempt to make moves that cross Chinese "red lines" will mean the kind of "hot conflict" that will have huge costs.
Obviously the Chinese leadership does not want a "hot" confrontation now - the very fact that Pelosi's plane landed is indicative.
But it also cannot allow the visit to be seen as a "fait accompli" that it could neither prevent nor "punish."
And that means it will try in the coming days to send the message that this visit "comes at a cost" for both the Taiwanese leadership and the US.
This again will confront the US leadership with the question whether at this stage it really wants to escalate the confrontation with China, as some voices seem to want, or whether a new major focus of geopolitical confrontation is beyond the capabilities of the US at the moment, which may explain why there have been voices from the US establishment, exemplified by Thomas Friedman, who have disapproved of Pelosi's move.
Source: in.gr
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