Although the Russian side has stressed in various ways that what it wants to discuss with Turkey is developments in Ukraine, after all, Turkey is reportedly part of the mechanism proposed to export the grain that is currently blockaded by the Russian navy in Ukraine's Black Sea ports, Turkey mainly has its eyes on Syria at the moment and trying to get the green light for a new military operation.[/B] Something that the Russians probably recognize, judging by the fact that Lavrov will be accompanied by Russian Defense Ministry officials.
The complex relationship between Turkey and Russia with regard to Syria
This visit brings to the fore the complex relationship between Russia and Turkey with regard to Syria.
This visit brings to the fore the complex relationship between Russia and Turkey with regard to Syria. Initially the two countries had an opposing position and in part this is still true. Turkey from the beginning supported armed opposition organizations and agreed with the goal of overthrowing the Assad government, unlike Russia, which from the beginning sided with the Damascus government.
Indeed, the culmination of the two countries' opposition to Syria was the November 2105 shooting down of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 fighter jet by a Turkish Air Force F-16, the first downing of a Russian or Soviet aircraft by a NATO aircraft since the Korean War.
However, gradually things began to change. And the crucial aspect was the developments in relation to the Syrian Kurds. Already at the time of the Kurds' resistance in Kobani against the Islamic State - and the great strain it was also creating among the Kurds in Turkey - Turkey increasingly saw the fact that the Kurds were gaining de facto sovereignty over areas of Syria as an "existential" danger. This fear was reinforced by the fact that as early as 2015 it appeared that the US was investing in the Kurdish militias as a vanguard in the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey has since claimed the right to have an armed presence on Syrian soil in order to be able to strike the Kurds and strengthen the Syrian armed organisations it supports.
This, however, presupposed an understanding with Russia, especially since it appeared that Russian forces had a decisive role in the conflict. Russia - like Iran - may support the Assad government, but Russia also supports territorial and political integrity in Syria, with clear opposition to any plan for partition. Turkey therefore needed to come to terms with the main foreign power with a strong presence in the region, which was at the same time a power in talks with all those involved, including the Kurds.
The relationship between Russia and the Kurds
Russia's relationship with the Kurds is also complex. Russia has made it clear that it believes that the Kurds should be included in the discussion about the next day of a united Syria, with a local autonomy regime that does not compromise the unity of the country. At the same time, they obviously do not look kindly on the way the US is using the Kurds as a way to maintain a permanent presence in the region and to prevent government forces from gaining control of even larger areas.
This means that by playing a power-broker role in Syria, Russia is trying in relations with both Turkey and the Kurds to simultaneously try to strengthen the position of government forces.
For example, during Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016, Russia ensured both the clearing of East Aleppo from opposition armed forces and the advancement of government forces. In 2019, during the last major Turkish operation ("Spring Fountain"), Russia ensured the presence of Syrian government forces in several locations. Indeed, it is significant that in 2018, Russia had tried to prevent the Turkish operation in Afrin ("Olive Branch"), essentially proposing to the Kurds to accept that the region should pass to government control.
The difficulties of Turkish planning
Turkey has a very specific plan for Syria. It seeks to establish a large "security zone", to strike and pressure the Kurds, and to strengthen the position of its backed "Syrian National Army."
Now what Turkey seeks is to be able to take control of important areas that will weaken the Kurds' position in northern Syria, especially Tel Rifaat and Manbij.
To achieve this, there needs to be tolerance from both the Americans, who have their own forces in the areas under Kurdish control, and the Russians who are also interested in these areas.
And the problem is that Russia may generally have no problem in some respects facilitating Turkey, especially when this may also deepen some rifts in Turkey's relations with the US, but at the same time it does not want to see its own planning for Syria thwarted.
For example, it is a question of whether Russia can offer Turkey what the latter is asking for in relation to Manbij and Tel Rifaat if the advancement of Turkish forces and the "Syrian National Army" in this area would compromise the Russian plan, which is precisely to strengthen the government forces in these areas.
Essentially, if Turkey and pro-Turkish forces gain control of Manbij they also gain control of the M4 highway on the stretch that connects Aleppo to the northeast of the country and that connects the areas east and west of the Euphrates, which is obviously not something that the government forces, who generally would not want to see Turkish and pro-Turkish forces so close to Aleppo, want. In any case, Russia was also in an ongoing negotiation with Turkey for the southernmost part of the M4 highway, namely the part near Idlib, so that uninterrupted communication between Latakia and Aleppo could be restored.
Russia does not want to see the Kurds take a big hit either, especially since its main plan with regard to them is to be able to disengage them from the relationship with the US and bring them into a process of understanding with the government forces.
Turkish pressure and Russian dilemmas
Turkey considers itself to have an elevated bargaining position and is expected to exert great pressure to secure Russia's acquiescence to a new operation in Syria. Russia would like to be able to continue to maintain this peculiar relationship with Turkey while there is new friction between Turkey and the US. However, it is by no means a given that it is ready to sacrifice its overall planning for Syria, as it has shown in all previous phases where any accommodations to Turkey never compromised the core of Russian planning.
Source: in.gr
Contents of this article including associated images are belongs Cyprus Times
Views & opinions expressed are those of the author and/or Cyprus Times
Source
